Germany Reunified: International and Constitutional Problems by Steinberger, Helmut
BYU Law Review
Volume 1992 | Issue 1 Article 6
3-1-1992
Germany Reunified: International and
Constitutional Problems
Helmut Steinberger
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, European
Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Helmut Steinberger, Germany Reunified: International and Constitutional Problems, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 23 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1992/iss1/6
Germany Reun5ed: International and 
Constitutional Problems 
Helmut Steinbergei 
Editor's note-Professor Steinberger presented this speech 
on February 21, 1991 at a symposium held at Brigham Young 
University. 
Let me first express my sincere gratitude for the invitation 
to participate in and to speak before this conference organized 
by the distinguished Law, Business and International Studies 
institutions of Brigham Young University. It is a great honor, 
indeed, for me to contribute to this panel by discussing some of 
the international and constitutional problems of the reunified 
Germany. 
Few other countries can claim that their constitutional 
histories and status have been so intensely conditioned by 
international instruments as have Germany's. Since the peace 
treaties of Westphalia of 1648,' which terminated the 
* Professor of Law, Heidelberg University; Co-Director, Max Planck Institute 
for Public International Law; former Justice of the Constitutional Court of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
1. The Peace Treaties of Westphalia contained important religious, 
constitutional and political regulations, thereby leading to deep and hndamental 
changes of traditional structures in Europe. Two treaties were signed: 1) 
Instrumentum Pacis Monasteriensis [Treaty of Peace of Munster], Oct. 24, 1648, 
Fr.-Empire, 1 Consol. T.S. 273 (1969) (English translation begins at 319); and 2) 
Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis [Treaty of Peace of Osnabrug], Od. 24, 1645, 
Swed.-Empire, 1 Consol. T.S. 121 (1969) (English translation begins at 198) 
[hereinafter Osnaburg Treaty]. The Osnaburg Treaty, supra art. XVII, 941 10 & 14, 
extended the scope of both treaties to include many other parties. Therefore, both 
treaties gained a much stronger acceptance among the European sovereigns than 
the number of signatory states might imply. 
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devastating thirty-year waq2 almost every German 
constitution has been conditioned by international instruments. 
This was true with the Congress of Vienna and its impact 
upon the establishment of the German Confederation and with 
the Peace Treaty of Versailles on the Weimar Constitution of 
1919.' Similarly, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany of 1949; and the status of Berlin and Germany as a 
whole,5 were conditioned by legal instruments of the 
occupation powers. International instruments will also 
condition the status of the reunified Germany. 
The process of German unification has unfolded on various 
legal levels which, although intrinsically connected, can be 
distinguished from one another for the purpose of analysis. I 
will address only a few essential and pertinent features of the 
respective levels. 
A. The International Law Level 
Two important features characterize the international law 
level. First, the four-power status of Germany as a whole was 
determined in 1945 and has continued ever since.6 Second, the 
2. Starting mainly as a religious controversy in 1618, this war soon assumed 
the character of a far-reaching political struggle. Deeply-rooted discords between 
Protestant and Catholic states, between the provincial diets ("Landstande") and the 
sovereigns, between the imperial, free cities ("Reichsstadte") and the emperor, and 
between Habsburg and France culminated in this war. 
3. Article 178 of the Weimar Constitution explicitly expressed the intention to 
keep the Peace Treaty of Versailles unaffected. For the text of this constitution, 
see 2 ERNSF RUDOLF HUBER, S'I'AATSRECHT DER NEUZEIT 25 (1951). 
4. The current text of the Grundgesetz [federal constitution or the German 
"Basic Law"] (hereinafter GG) may be taken from BGB1. 111, No. 100-1. An English 
translation can be obtained through the Press and Information Office of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
5. By the so-called "Frankfurt Documents" issued on July 1, 1948, the western 
military governors, while authorizing the elaboration of a formal constitution, 
determined the general principles to be respected in the future constitution and 
made its corning into force dependent on their consent (which was given by the so- 
called "Letter of Approvalw on May 12, 1949). For the text and detailed information 
on this topic, see BODO D E N N E ~ ,  BONNER KOMMENTAR, KOMMENTAR ZUM 
BONNER GRUNDGESETZ 3 (1950). 
6. The main documents in this regard, establishing and conhning the four 
power status of Germany, are: (1) the Declaration of the Governments of France, 
Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States "regarding the defeat of 
Germany and the assumption of supreme authority with respect to Germany" (the 
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Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany (the 
so-called Two Plus Four Treaty), signed by the two German 
States and the four main victorious powers of 1945,~ was rati- 
fied by united Germany after formal reunification. An addition- 
al feature of the international level is that the formal term- 
ination of the membership of the German Democratic Republic 
(G.D.R.) in the Warsaw Pact took place before re~nification.~ 
B. The Treaty Relations Level Between German States 
A second level is the treaty relationship between the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) and the G.D.R. that led to 
reunification. The two most important treaties in this context 
are: (1) the Treaty Establishing a Monetary, Economic and 
Social Union: which established this union between the two 
parts of Germany on July 1, 1990; and (2) the Treaty on Unifi- 
cation, which became effective on September 29, 1990.1° An 
additional agreement" was signed on September 18, 1990, 
regarding the execution and interpretation of both the Treaty 
so-called "Berlin Declaration"), June 5, 1945, 60 Stat. 1649, 68 U.N.T.S. 189; (2) 
The Potsdam Protocol restating the assertion of the three western Powers of full 
governmental power in Germany, August 2, 1945, 3 Bevans 1224; (3) The Quadri- 
partite Agreement on Berlin, September 3, 1971, 24 U.S.T 285, 880 U.N.T.S. 115; 
(4) the Declaration of the Governments of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union 
and the United States regarding rights and responsibilities with respect to Germa- 
ny on the occasion of the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic to the United Nations, November 9, 1972 (for this 
text, see BULLETIN DES m S S E  UND INFoRMATIoNsAMTES DER BUNDESREGIERUNG 
1884 (1972)). See also Helmut Steinberger, Voelkertechtliche Aspekte des deutsch- 
Sowjetischen Vertragswerks vom 12. August 1970 [International Law Aspects of the 
German-Souiet Treaty of August 12, 19701, 31 ZAORV 63, 123 (1971). 
7. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, S. 
TREATY DOC. No. 20, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), 29 I.L.M. 1186 (1990) [hereinaf- 
ter Two Plus Four Treaty]. 
8. See East Germany Becomes the First to Leave the Warsaw Pact, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 25, 1990, at A10. 
9. Treaty Establishing a Monetary, Economic and Social Union, May 18, 1990, 
BGB1. I1 537, 29 I.L.M. 1108 (1990) [hereinafter State Treaty]. Generally known as 
the "State Treaty," the agreement was accompanied by a "Joint Protocol Concern- 
ing Principles" and nine Attachments. See id. 
10. Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Demo- 
cratic Republic on the Establishment of German Unity, Aug. 31, 1990, BGBl. 11 
889 [hereinafter Treaty on Unification]. An English version of this treaty has been 
published by the German Information Center, 950 Third Avenue, New York, NY 
10022. 
11. Agreement on the Enforcement and Interpretation of the Treaty on Unifica- 
tion, Sept. 18, 1990, BGBl. I1 822. 
on Unification and the Treaty of All-German Elections.12 
In regard to this level of inter-German treaty relations, the 
government of the Federal Republic of Germany has never 
recognized the G.D.R. as a foreign state. This attitude persisted 
even after both the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. became members of 
the United Nations. The F.R.G. did not consider the rela- 
tionship between the states to be governed exclusively by inter- 
national law. The F.R.G. considered the attempt at  secession by 
the G.D.R. from the German state (which State had not been 
extinguished in 1945, in 1949, or a t  any later time) as invalid 
as long as the people in the G.D.R. could not exercise their 
right of self-determination. In particular the Federal Constitu- 
tional Court, in 1973,13 1987,14 and 1990l5 decisions, con- 
stantly upheld this legal evaluation. This "unrealistic" point of 
view provoked a great deal of criticism from both inside and 
outside of Germany. In a 1987 decision, the Court stated that 
the overwhelming majority of the German people in both parts 
of Germany still maintained the desire to be reunified? 
The fmt free elections in the G.D.R. took place on March 
18, 1990, and resulted in a government under Prime Minister 
de Maiziere, a pro-unification Christian Democrat, and a coali- 
tion of the democratic parties. This result suggested that the 
political wishes of the people in the G.D.R. were directed to- 
ward llnification by joining the Federal Republic and not to- 
ward any kind of confederation or looser union." 
Likewise, the Treaty of May 18, 1990 on the Monetary, 
Economic and Social Union evidences a desire of the people in 
the G.D.R. to follow the F.R.G.. The treaty contains common, 
fundamental, and substantive constitutional elements. Article 
Two provides that both contracting parties committed them- 
12. Vertrag zur Vorbereitung und Durchfuhrung der ersten gesamtdeutschen 
Wahlen des Deutschen Bundestages zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und 
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [Treaty regarding all-German elections], 
Aug. 3, 1990, BGB1. 11 822. The electoral portion of this agreement was subse- 
quently amended because the Federal Constitutional Court, on September 29, 1990, 
declared that part unconstitutional. Judgment of Sept. 29, 1990, 82 Entscheidungen 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [hereinafkr cited as 
BVerfGE] 322 (F.R.G.). The elections took place on December 21, 1990. 
13. Judgment of July 31, 1973, 36 BVerfGE 1 (F.R.G.). 
14. Judgment of Oct. 21, 1987, 77 BVerfGE 137 (F.R.G.). 
15. Judgment of Sept. 29, 1990, 82 BVeffiE 322 (F.R.G.). 
16. Judgment of Oct. 21, 1987, 77 BVerfGE 137 (F.R.G.). 
17. This view is analyzed in more detail in Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional 
Law of German Unification, 50 MD. L. REV. 475, 587 (1991). 
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selves to the principles of a basic, free, democratic, federal 
social order under the rule of law.18 This terminology is sisni- 
lar to that used in Articles Twenty and Twenty-one of the 
Basic Law of the Federal Republic.'' Article Two also provides 
that conflicting provisions of the G.D.R.'s constitution on the 
fundamentals of its longstanding socialist order will no longer 
apply.20 Even at that juncture this language imposed an obli- 
gation on the G.D.R. to  desist from the ideological basis of its 
legal order and t o  turn to the fundamentals of the F.R.G.'s 
constitutional order. 
C. The Purely Internal Legal Orders Level 
The third level of the unification process consists of purely 
internal legal structures created since reunification. 
IV. PROBLEMS FROM THE LEGAL LEVELS OF GERMAN 
REUNIEICATION 
A few problems from these different levels have arisen in 
the context of German reunification. 
A. Dissolution of Four-Power Institutions 
Article Seven of the Two Plus Four Treaty terminates the 
rights and responsibilities of the four powers relating to  Berlin 
and germ an^.^' As a result, the quadripartite agreements 
concerning Berlin are terminated and all four-power institu- 
tions, like common air control and military missions, are dis- 
solved.22 
The three western powers and the reunified Germany have 
already ratified this treaty." The Supreme 'Soviet has this 
week started a session with the question of its ratification on 
its agenda. Until the Soviet Union ratifies the treaty, it will not 
be in force. By a declaration of October 1, 1990, the four powers 
have suspended their rights and responsibilities as of October 
18. State Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2. 
19. GG, arts. XX and XXI. 
20. State Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, 8 2. 
21. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 7, art. 7. 
22. Id. 
23. On March 4, 1991, subsequent to Professor Steinberger's delivery of this 
address, the Soviet Union ratified the Two Plus Four Treaty. See N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
5, 1991, at A3; see also Quint, supra note 17, at 620 1.1.520. 
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3, 1990? An unclear legal situation would result should the 
Soviet Union not ratify the treaty. 
B. German Borders 
The Two Plus Four Treaty provides in article one that 
upon its enactment the current external borders of the F.R.G. 
and of the G.D.R. will be final.25 Section two of article one 
provides that united Germany and Poland shall confirm the 
existing border between them in a treaty binding under inter- 
national law.26 
Interestingly enough, no similar provision has been includ- 
ed with regard to  the German territories of East Pmssia, which 
were placed under the administration of the Soviet Union. No 
final settlement of the borders of Germany had been estab- 
lished, either at the 1945 "Big Three" Potsdam Conference, 
which had expressly reserved the final delineation to a peace 
settlement, or at any later date. 
The territorial question was a central issue of the external 
aspects of reunification. Germany stood to permanently lose be- 
tween one-fourth and one-third of its former territory. Whether 
this settlement is t o  be qualified as a cession of territory by 
united Germany or as a recognition of an annexation is contro- 
versial. Notwithstanding this issue, German territorial sover- 
eignty over the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line will be 
terminated as of the relevant date. 
It was not an easy decision for the F.R.G. to agree t o  this 
settlement considering that these territories had been German 
for eight hundred years and that twelve million Germans had 
been driven from their homes or had been fugitives before the 
Red Army. But this is one possible result when a nation starts 
a war of aggression and then loses. 
C. The Military Status of a United Germny 
A very serious issue that developed after the fall of 1989 
was the future military status of a united Germany. 
24. See Thomas L. Friedman, Allies Waive Occupation Rights, Clearing Way for 
German Unity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1990, at All. 
25. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 7, art. 1. The settlement of the territori- 
al question was considered by all six contracting parties as central and indispens- 
able to hture European peace and security. 
26. Id. art. 1, 8 2 .  
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1. United Germany's Membership in NATO 
The F.R.G. has been a member of NATO since 1955. The 
issue was whether to allow an enlarged F.R.G. to continue this 
membership. 
The Soviet position on this question is clear, as is its devel- 
opment on the issue. Initially, the Soviets insisted that a unit- 
ed Germany could not be a member of NATO. I had always 
considered this as a negotiation tactic to heighten the Soviet 
position: the Soviet Union wanted the highest possible price for 
their acceptance of NATO membership for united Germany. 
The Soviets have been very clever in foreign policy. They 
recognized NATO's dual function with respect to the F.R.G. 
since it joined the alliance in 1955. First, it acts as an effective 
defense system for the alliance, thereby lending the indispens- 
able component of political stability to the alliance. Second, it 
exerts a permanent and effective control over the F.R.G.'s mili- 
tary capability while at the same time integrating this capabili- 
ty into the defense potential of the West. To have this control 
by NATO extended to a united Germany was not against the 
interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviets realized that the 
F.R.G. could never consent to leaving NATO and losing the 
alliance's protection. A breakthrough in regard to this issue 
finally resulted from a face- to-face meeting between Mr. 
Gorbachev and Chancellor KohL2' The Soviet Union agreed to 
allow a unified Germany to continue the NATO status enjoyed 
by the F.R.G. In addition, Mr. Gorbachev committed to with- 
draw Soviet forces from the former G.D.R. 
Unified Germany possesses the right to participate in mul- 
tinational alliances in addition to NATO. The Two Plus Four 
Treaty provides that "[tlhe right of the united Germany to 
belong to alliances, with all the rights and responsibilities 
arising therefrom, shall not be affected by the present Trea- 
t ~ . ~ ~  Nevertheless, the treaty contains certain provisions re- 
lating to the future military status of Germany. 
27. See Council on Foreign Relations, Germany's Unification, 1990, AMERICA 
AND THE WORLD 179; Encounter at Staurapallo, THE ECONOMIST, July 21, 1990, at 
47. 
28. State Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6. 
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2. Germany's position on weapons and nuclear proliferation 
United Germany chose to stand by the renunciation of the 
manufacture, possession, and control of nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons and its rights and obligations arising from 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.29 No political opposition 
arose over this de~ision?~ Additionally, when acceding to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the F.R.G. expressly declared that it 
would be fully obligated to the collective security regulations of 
NATO. The F.R.G. also preserved its position in regard to a 
future European Political Union's disposition of nuclear weap- 
ons. 
3. Armd forces in Germany 
Article three, section two of the Two Plus Four Treaty 
reiterates a declaration by the two German governments that 
Germany will reduce the personnel strength of its armed forces 
to 370,000, beginning with implementation of the first Conven- 
tional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.31 In connec- 
tion with this reduction of the German forces, Germany and 
the Soviet Union state in article four that "the conditions for 
and the duration of the presence of Soviet armed forces . . . as 
well as the conduct of the withdrawal of these armed forces 
which will be completed by the end of 1994" will be settled by a 
German-Soviet treatyF2 
Until the completion of the withdrawal of the Soviet armed 
forces, only German territorial defense units not assigned to 
NATO will be stationed in the former G.D.R. and in Berlin. 
During this period, armed forces of other states will not be 
stationed in or carry out any other military activity in these 
two areas.33 
After the complete withdrawal of Soviet armed forces, 
united Germany can station units of German forces assigned to 
NATO in the former G.D.R. and Berlin. However, foreign 
29. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. 
30. See Juergen Ruhfus, Proliferation Isn't a German Probkm, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 25, 1991, at A19. 
31. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 7, art. 3, Q 2. 
32. Id. art. 4, Q 1. 
33. Id. art. 5, Q 3. 
231 GERMANY REUNIFIED 31 
armed forces and nuclear weapons or their carriers must not be 
stationed in that part of Germany or deployed there." Contro- 
versies arose over the term "deploy," i.e., whether "deploy" 
would exclude joint maneuvers. To resolve this issue, an agreed 
minute was attached to the treaty stating that "[alny questions 
with respect to the application of the word 'deployed' . . . will 
be decided by the Government of the united Germany in a 
reasonable and responsible way taking into account the secu- 
rity interests of each Contracting  part^."^' 
D. United Germany's Treaty Obligations 
The question of continued membership in NATO is a subdi- 
vision of a larger international law issue. This larger issue 
deals with the question of state succession of the united Ger- 
many into the thousands of treaties concluded by the former 
G.D.R. 
General international law contains some acknowledged 
principles with regard to state succession. However, a number 
of state succession issues have no generally accepted principles 
that can be distilled from state practice, divergent as i t  has 
been. Even the generally recognized rules are qualified as dis- 
positive rules: they may be deviated from by the consent of the 
states concerned, but are not part of the international jus 
cogens. 
The most uncontroversial principle is the so-called "moving 
borders theory" dealing with the territorial scope of treaty 
application. This principle is not as complicated as it sounds. 
Suppose State A cedes part of its territory to state B and both 
states remain in existence. In such a circumstance, the territo- 
rial scope of application of State A's treaties retreats from the 
ceded territory, while the tenitorid scope of State B's treaties 
is ipso jure extended to the newly acquired territory?6 An ex- 
ception to this principle is assumed only where the very nature 
of the treaty's contents excludes extension of its territorial 
applicability. 
This principle, strictly taken, may not apply to the German 
case because the G.D.R. ceased to exist as an international law 
34. Id. 
35. Id. Agreed Minute. 
36. A common example of this concept would be the terms of most-favored- 
nation clauses. 
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subject as of October 3, 1991. 
1. Treaties of the F.R. G. before unification 
Aside from the issue of NATO and the other modifications 
made by the Two Plus Four Treaty:' the most important case 
in which the moving borders principle may apply is the exten- 
sion of the treaties of the European Community to the territory 
of the former G.D.R. 
Early in 1990, there was some question within the Com- 
mission of the European Community whether unified Germany 
would have to be qualified as a new state. This would possibly 
require new accession to, or at  least modification of, the Euro- 
pean Community's treaties. This question was answered when 
the F.R.G. took the position that even after unification, it re- 
tained and continued its identity as the same subject of inter- 
national law as before. The F.R.G. has taken this position from 
,the very beginning of its constitution: it regards itself as the 
identical subject, and not a successor, of the German state 
established in 1870-71. This position is indeed the precondition 
for these consequences under international law.38 Article Elev- 
en of the Treaty on Unification accordingly states that the 
parties proceed from the assumption that treaties in force and 
concluded by the F.R.G. before unification extend to the territo- 
ry of the former G.D.ReSQ If in individual cases adjustment is 
required, the government of the united Germany will consult 
with the respective contracting party. 
There are exceptions to the applicability of pre-unification 
F.R.G. treaties, including exceptions to the extension of the 
scope of the territorial application of the treaties concluded by 
the F.R.G. before unification.40 They concern the treaties 
which the F.R.G. concluded with the three western powers in 
1954 concerning its relations with them4' and the treaties 
37. See supra part III. C. 
38. See RUDOLF GEIGER, GRUNDGESETZ UND V~LKERRECHT 60 (1985); Wilfried 
Fiedler, Die staatsund v6&e?rechtliche Stellung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 43 
JURI~NZEITUNG 132 (1988). 
39. Treaty on Unification, supra note 10, art. 11. 
40. These exceptions are listed in the Treaty on Unification, supra note 10, 
AMex I, 8 I. 
41. Vertrag zur  Regelung aus Krieg und Besatzung entstandener fkagen [Treaty 
on the Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Three Powers], 
May 26th, 1952, BGB1. 11 305, as amended by protocol of October 23, 1954, BGBI. 
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concerning the stationing of NATO and French forces in the 
F.R.G." To extend these to the territory of the former G.D.R. 
would conflict, a t  least for the time being, with the provisions 
in the Two Plus Four Treaty mentioned above. 
2. The treaties of the former G.D.R. 
Less clear under general international law is the legal 
situation in regard to treaties concluded by and still in force for 
the former G.D.R. One aspect of the problem is almost beyond 
controversy: that G.D.R. treaties with ideological-political con- 
tents inconsistent with the attitude of the unified state are no 
longer valid. 
In the case of the G.D.R., its membership in the Warsaw 
Pact military alliance was terminated before unification. But 
other treaties were still in force a t  llnification. It must be as- 
sumed that treaties of a specific ideological-political content 
and context ceased to be valid with regard to unified Germany. 
As to the G.D.R.'s other treaty obligations, article twelve of 
the Treaty on Unification takes the position that there must be 
consultations with the other contracting parties in order to 
regulate or state the treaties' continuation, adjustment or ter- 
mination. These consultations must take various factors into 
account: the principle of good faith; the interests of the parties 
concerned, including those of the F.R.G.; the competency of the 
European Community (under which many economic agree- 
ments will fall); and the principles of a free, democratic basic 
order under the rule of law. The position appears to correspond 
to a Resolution of the 1978 Vienna Conference on State Succes- 
sion regarding treaties." The Vienna Convention, not yet in 
force, "recommends that if a uniting of states gives rise to  in- 
I1 405. 
42. Vertrag iiber den Aufenthalt ausl&ndischer' Streitkriifte in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Treaty Concerning Stationing of Foreign Troops in 
the F.R.G.], Oct. 23, 1954, BGBI. 253 (1955); Deutsch-franzlisische 
Regierungsvereinbmng-Das Stationierungsrecht und die Statusfragen der 
franzlisischen Truppen in Deutschland [German-French Governmental Agreement-- 
The Law on Stationing of Troops and the Questions of the Status of French Troops 
in Germany], Dec. 21, 1966, Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamtes der 
Bundesregierung 1304 (1966); NATO Truppenstatut [NATO Statute on Troops], 
June 19, 1951, BGB1. II 1183, 1190 (1961) including various Additional Agree- 
ments. 
43. See Hans D. Treviranus, Die Konvention der Vereinten Natwnen ueber 
Stcratensukzession bei Vertragen, 39 ZAORV 259, 271 (1979). 
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compatible obligations or rights under treaties, the successor 
state and the other states parties of the treaties in question 
make every effort to  resolve the matter by mutual agree- 
ment.'M4 
V. TWO CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF THE PF~OCESS OF 
UNIFICATION 
Turning to constitutional issues of the process of d i c a -  
tion, only two problems will be singled out. The two specific 
issues to be addressed are: (1) regulation of expropriations in 
the former G.D.R., and (2) the abortion law. The Unification 
Treaty in regard to these issues provided regulations which did 
not comply with the Basic Law as it then stood. Therefore, the 
Treaty provided for express amendments to the Basic Law. The 
law assenting to  the treaty accordingly had to be enacted as a 
constitutional amendment under the procedure of Article Sev- 
enty-Nine of the Basic Law. An amendment requires a two- 
thirds majority in the Federal Diet and in the Federal Council, 
the organ in which the governments of the states of the Feder- 
ation are represented. That procedure was observed, and the 
majorities were assembled. 
A foreign observer might be inclined to question, 'What 
then is your constitutional problem?" The very serious constitu- 
tional problem arises under Section Three of Article Seventy- 
Nine, the article dealing with amendments to the Basic Law. 
That section provides, "[almendments of this Basic Law af- 
fecting . . . the basic principles laid down in Articles One and 
Twenty, shall be inad~nissible."~~ The principle referred to in 
Article One is that the state has the duty to respect and protect 
human dignity. The principles in Article !lkenty, referred to  by 
Section Three of Article Seventy-Nine, are the principles of the 
democra t ic ,  soc ia l  a n d  f e d e r a l  s t a t e  a n d  t h e  
"Rechtsstaatsprinzip" or rule of law. 
The constitutional question, then, is whether the constitu- 
tional amendments contained in the unification treaty dealing 
with these two issues are null and void because they violate 
Article Seventy-Nine, Section Three, in connection with the 
principles laid down in Articles One and Twenty. 
44. Id. 
45. GG, art. 79, 8 3. 
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A. Expropriation by the Former G.D.R. 
In regard to the expropriation issue, the government of the 
G.D.R., in connection with the negotiations on the economic 
union in the spring of 1990, took the position that it was an 
indispensable precondition for such union that expropriations 
effected in the years between 1945 and 1949 on the basis of 
occupation laws or under the authority of the occupation power 
would have to be respected. These expropriations, which were 
really confiscations, occurred as part of the so-called land re- 
form. All real estate parcels over 250 acres were confiscated 
without compensation. Two-thirds of this land was distributed 
to small farmers, and one-third was retained by the state. 
During negotiations on this subject, the Modrow Govern- 
ment turned to the Soviet Union for support. This resulted in a 
declaration of March 27, 1990 which stated that the "eventual 
attempts" to deny the rights of present owners of real estate 
and other property, which in the relevant years (1945-49) had 
been acquired with the consent or on the basis of decisions of 
the Soviet Union, would be absolutely unacceptable. The new 
G.D.R. government under Prime Minister de Maiziere took the 
same position. A Joint Declaration of the two German govern- 
ments of June 15, 1990 stated that the expropriation on the 
basis of occupation law or under the authority of the occupation 
power in the time between 1945 and 1949 could not be taken 
back. The governments of the G.D.R. and the Soviet Union do 
not see any possibility to reverse these measures. The F.R.G. is 
of the opinion that a future all-German parliament must make 
a final decision on possible compensation by the state. 
This joint declaration was verbally inserted in the Treaty 
on Unification in article forty-one section one? The F.R.G. 
undertook the obligation not to enact provisions conflicting 
with the Joint Declaration. In Article Four, numbers four and 
five of the Treaty on Unification, the F.R.G. also undertook to 
amend the Basic Law with the goal to secure this resolution of 
the expropriation issue." The constitutional amendment was 
brought about by article four, number five, section three of the 
Treaty on Unif i~at ion.~~ It provides that regulations in article 
46. Treaty on Unification, supra note 10, art. 41, 5 1. 
47. Id. art. 4, numbers 4-5. 
48. Treaty on Unification, supra note 10, art. 4, number 5, 5 3. 
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forty-one and regulations to implement article forty-one shall 
be maintained and shall stand insofar as they provide that ex- 
propriations shall not be rolled back? This was enacted as a 
new Article 143 of the Basic Lawe50 
Meanwhile, many constitutional complaints have been 
entered against these provisions. They claim a violation of 
Article Seventy-nine, Section Three of the Basic Law, i.e., they 
assert the unconstitutionality of a constitutional amendment. 
Those asserting the amendment's unconstitutionality argue 
that the principle of human dignity comprises at  least a certain 
minimum of property protection such that property must not be 
taken, as in this case, without any possibility of legal remedy, 
and without the slightest compensation. Other opponents con- 
sider this a violation of the principles of Re~htsstaatlichkeit.~~ 
The argument is not that the Basic Law and its principles 
were to be applied to measures taken between 1945 and 1949, 
before the Basic Law had even entered into force, or to mea- 
sures taken by or under the authority of a foreign occupation 
power. Rather, the argument claims that the F.R.G. in 1990 
was constitutionally barred from accepting the perpetuation of 
these measures even by amending its constitution. 
I doubt that the Federal Constitutional Court will declare 
the relevant provisions in the Treaty on Unification and the 
relevant amendment of the Basic Law unconstitutional and 
void. I rather suspect that it will try to find a solution by point- 
ing to the possibility of adequate compensation in some form. 
The Court might find that the international situation involving 
the Soviet Union leaves no other realistic possibility for the 
F.R.G. than merely to accept, not to  approve of, that situation. 
Acceptance may bring a constitutional solution nearer than 
non-acceptance, and nonacceptance may bar, at least for a 
crucial period of time, the accomplishment of German unifica- 
tion. 
49. Id. 
50. GG, art. 143. 
51. The "Rechtsstaatsprinzip" represents one of the fundamental principles of 
the Basic Law. See Judgment of Oct. 25, 1966, 20 BVerfGE 323, 331 (F.R.G.). 
Being a general axiom, it has been molded by multiple provisions of the Basic 
Law. The Rechtsstaatsprinzip is embodied in and expressed by; e.g., the Basic 
Rights, the balance of power, the principle of the priority of the constitution and 
the statutes, and even, at least in principle, in the right of compensation in the 
case of expropriations. Concerning this principle, see 1 KLAUS STERN, DAS 
~MTSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DrnPrSCHLAND 602 (1977). 
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The government, pleading before the Court, argued that 
the position of the Soviet Union regarding the finality of expro- 
priations was absolutely insurmountable. The Soviet Union 
probably took this position because these confiscations were 
unlawfid even under international law, and the Soviet Union 
did not want to have this confirmed by German courts. 
B. The Abortion Law 
The Treaty on Unification provides that principles of the 
Basic Law, as well as federal statutory law beginning October 
3, 1990, apply to the territory of the former G.D.R. and to East 
Berlin. Therefore, laws of the G.D.R. incompatible with the 
Basic Law or with federal law lose their validity. 
The annexes to the Treaty on Unification provide for many 
exceptions for certain transitional periods. Some of the devia- 
tions from the Basic Law have been secured by constitutional 
amendments, the most important of which I have just men- 
tioned. 
The treaty and a constitutional amendment, which is now 
Article 143, Section One of the Basic Law, provide that law of 
the former G.D.R. may deviate from the Basic Law until De- 
cember 31, 1992." The law may deviate only to the extent 
that, and as long as, a complete adjustment to the constitution- 
al order cannot be accompli~hed.~~ Such deviations must not 
violate Article Nineteen, Section Two and must be compatible 
with Article Seventy-Nine, Section Three of the Basic Law? 
This constitutional amendment was adopted, in particular, to 
constitutionally safeguard a provision in an annex to the Trea- 
ty on Unification which maintains the G.D.R. law on abortion. 
This law permits abortion during the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy. The Treaty on Unification, article thirty-one, section 
four, provides that the legislature shall enact a regulation pro- 
viding for a better protection of the unborn life and for a con- 
stitutional solution of the situation of conflicts of pregnant 
women by December 31, 1992.55 Should such a regulation not 
be enacted by that date, the substantive law in the territory of 
62. GG, art. 143, # 1. 
53. Id. 
64. Id. 
55. Treaty on Unification, supra note 10, art. 31, # 4. 
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the former G.D.R. shall continue to be valid.56 
This provision of the treaty and the constitutional amend- 
ment, to the extent they are related to the abortion law of the 
former G.D.R., are under heavy attack by a number of constitu- 
tional lawyers. The question is whether the relevant G.D.R. 
law is in compliance with Article Seventy-Nine, Section Three 
of the Basic Law:' assuming such G.D.R. law should be valid 
beyond the end of 1992. The G.D.R. law could easily be valid 
beyond 1992 because regulation by the federal legislature 
might not be accomplished, and the chances for a regulation 
complying with the decision of 1975 of the Federal Constitu- 
tional Court as of now appear rather slim. 
In my opinion, continuing the validity of the G.D.R. abor- 
tion law would indeed violate the principle of human dignity. 
The legislation of abortion, in our country as well as yours, is 
an exceedingly controversial topic. 
VI. FINAL REMARKS 
German unification caused serious irritations in Europe, 
more so in western Europe than in the eastern European 
states. The eastern European states must have realized that 
one result of their transformation into free societies would be 
that the German people could no longer be barred from their 
right to self-determination. The F.R.G. government tried to 
alleviate these irritations by pursuing, stronger than ever be- 
fore, a policy of European integration and a security system 
which would prevent a repetition of European history. I con- 
sider this to be the right path. United Germany has not yet 
found its role in world politics. However, in view of German 
history, this should not be resented too deeply. Germany will 
eventually find its proper role. 
Let me add a specific expression of gratitude. Since 1945, 
the western part of Germany has developed into a free society 
under the rule of law. The generous material aid, political 
support and military protection provided by the United States 
have allowed and encouraged this. Germans are also aware 
that the United States, more than any other state, has support- 
ed the quest of the German people for reunification and free 
56. Id. 
57. See text accompanying supm note 46. 
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self-determination. For that we are and will continue to be 
grateful. 
